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Abstract
This paper proposes models of learning process in teams of individuals who collectively execute a
sequence of tasks and whose actions are determined by individual skill levels and networks of interper-
sonal appraisals and influence. The closely-related proposed models have increasing complexity, starting
with a centralized manager-based assignment and learning model, and finishing with a social model of
interpersonal appraisal, assignments, learning, and influences. We show how rational optimal behavior
arises along the task sequence for each model, and discuss conditions of suboptimality. Our models
are grounded in replicator dynamics from evolutionary games, influence networks from mathematical
sociology, and transactive memory systems from organization science.
Index terms: collective learning, transactive memory systems, appraisal networks, influence networks,
evolutionary games, replicator dynamics, multi-agent systems
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and problem description
Researchers in sociology, psychology, and organization science have long studied the inner functioning and
performance of teams with multiple individuals engaged in tasks. Extensive qualitative studies, conceptual
models and empirical studies in the laboratory and field reveal some statistical features and various phenom-
ena of teams [15,17,23,26,33,34], but only a few quantitative and mathematical models are available [1,13,20].
In this paper we build mathematical models for the dynamics of team structure and performance. Our work
is based on the core idea that all the exhibited phenomena and features of teams must result from some
essential elements, that is, individual (member) attributes and the team’s inner structure. We aim to mathe-
matically characterize these essential elements of teams, investigate how they are related to team performance
and, most importantly, how they evolve with time.
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We consider a team of individuals with unknown skill levels who complete a sequence of tasks. The
team’s basic inner structure is characterized by the appraisal network. The appraisal network determines
how each task is assigned, and is updated via performance feedback and its co-evolution with the team’s
influence network. We aim to build multi-agent dynamical models in which (i) the team as an entirety
eventually achieves the optimal assignment of tasks to members; (ii) each individual’s true relative skill
level is asymptotically learned by the team members, which is referred to as collective learning. We then
investigate the model variations for what impairs collective learning.
1.2 Literature review
Our work is deeply connected with a conceptual model of team learning and performance, a transactive
memory system (TMS). A TMS is characterized by individuals’ skills and knowledge, combined with mem-
bers’ collective understanding of which members possess what knowledge [31]. When members share an
understanding of who knows what on the team, tasks can be assigned to members most likely to possess
the appropriate skills. As members observe the task performances of other members, their understanding of
”who knows what” tends to become more accurate and more similar, leading to greater coordination and in-
tegration of members’ knowledge. Empirical research across a range of team types and settings demonstrates
a strong positive relationship between the development of a team TMS and team performance [16,17,35].
In our models, collective learning arises as the result of the co-evolution of interpersonal appraisals and
influence networks. Related previous work includes social comparison theory [5], averaging-based social learn-
ing [9], opinion dynamics on influence networks [4,8,18,25], reflected appraisal mechanisms [2,7,11], dynamic
balance theory [22,30], and the combined evolution of interpersonal appraisals and influence networks [10].
In the modeling and analysis of the evolution of appraisal and influence networks, we also build an
insightful connection between our model and the well-known replicator dynamics studied in evolutionary
game theory; see the textbook [28], some control applications [6, 21], and the recent contributions [3, 19].
1.3 Contribution
Firstly, based on a few natural assumptions, we propose three novel models with increasing complexity for the
dynamics of teams: the manager dynamics, the assign/appraise dynamics, and the assign/appraise/influence
dynamics. Our work integrates three well-established types of dynamics: the replicator dynamics, the dy-
namics of appraisal networks, and the opinion dynamics on influence networks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time that such an integration has been proposed. Our models provide an insightful perspec-
tive on the connection between team performance and the interpersonal appraisal networks. In our models,
the performances of a team of individuals, with fixed skill levels, are determined by how a task is assigned.
For the baseline manager dynamics, task assignment is adjusted by an outside authority, according to the
replicator dynamics, with individuals’ performances as the feedback signals. The assign/appraise dynamics
elaborates the baseline model by assuming that, instead of an outside authority, the team members’ interper-
sonal appraisals as the basic inner structure determine the task assignments. In the assign/appraise/influence
dynamics model, we further elaborate the model by considering the co-evolution of appraisal and influence
networks.
Secondly, theoretical analysis is presented on the dynamical properties of the models we propose. We
prove that, for the assign/appraise and the assign/appraise/influence dynamics, task assignments determined
by the interpersonal appraisals satisfy the replicator dynamics in a generalized form. Moreover, results on
the models’ asymptotic behavior relate collective learning with the connectivity property of the observation
network, which defines the heterogeneous feedback signals each individual observes. We find that, for the
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assign/appraise dynamics with the initial appraisal network that is strongly connected and ha a self loop for
each node, the team achieves rational task assignment, if the observation network is strongly connected. For
the assign/appraise/influence dynamics with strongly connected and aperiodic initial appraisal network, the
team achieves collective learning, if the observation network has a globally reachable node. Our theoretical
results on the asymptotic behavior can be interpreted as the exploration of the most relaxed condition
for asymptotic optimal task assignment. In addition, the assign/appraise/influence dynamics describes an
emergence process by which team members’ perception of “who knows what” become more similar over time,
a fundamental feature of TMS [14,27].
Thirdly, besides the models in which the team eventually learns the individuals’ true relative skill lev-
els, we propose one variation in each of the three phases of the assign/appraise/influence dynamics: the
assignment rule, the update of appraisal network based on feedback signal, and the opinion dynamics for the
interpersonal appraisals. The variations reflect some sociological and psychological mechanisms known to
prevent the team from learning. We investigate by simulation numerous possible causes of failure to learn.
1.4 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next subsection introduces some preliminaries on evo-
lutionary games and replicator dynamics; Section II proposes our problem set-up and centralized manager
model; Section III introduces the assign/appraise dynamics; Section IV is the assign/appraise/influence
model; Section V discusses some causes of failure to learn; Section VI provides some further discussions and
conclusion.
1.5 Preliminaries
Evolutionary games apply game theory to evolving populations adopting different strategies. Consider a
game with finite pure strategies e1, e2, . . . , en and mixed strategies w ∈ int(∆n). The expected payoff for
mixed strategy v against mixed strategy w is defined as the payoff function pi(v,w) =
∑n
i=1 vipii(w), with
pii(w) = pi(ei,w) for simplicity. A strategy wˆ is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if any mutant strategy
v 6= wˆ, adopted by an -fraction of the population, brings less expected payoff than the majority strategy
wˆ, as long as  is sufficiently small. A necessary and sufficient condition for a local ESS is stated as follows:
there exists a neighborhood U(wˆ) such that, for any v ∈ U(wˆ) \ {wˆ}, pi(wˆ,v) > pi(v,v).
Replicator dynamics, given by equation (1), models the evolution of sub-population distribution w(t) ∈
∆n. Each sub-population i, with fraction wi(t) at time t, is using strategy ei and has the growth rate
proportional to its fitness, defined as the expected payoff pii(w(t)).
w˙i = wi
(
pii(w)−
n∑
k=1
wkpik(w)
)
. (1)
The time index t is omitted for simplicity. There is a simple connection between the ESS and the replicator
dynamics [28]: if the payoff function pi(v,w) is linear to w, then an ESS is a globally asymptotically stable
equilibrium for system (1); if pi(v,w) is nonlinear to w, then the ESS is locally asymptotically stable.
2 Problem Set-up and Manager Dynamics
In this section we introduce some basic formulations and a baseline centralized system on the evolution of a
team. Frequently used notations are listed in Table 1.
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2.1 Model assumptions and notations
a) Team, tasks and assignments: The basic assumption on the individuals and the tasks are given below.
Assumption 1 (Team, task type and assignment). Consider a team of n individuals characterized by a
fixed but unknown vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
> satisfying x  0n and x>1n = 1, where each xi denotes the skill
level of individual i. The tasks being completed by the team are assumed to have the following properties:
(i. The total workload of each task is characterized by a positive scalar and is fixed as 1 in this paper;
(ii. The task can be arbitrarily decomposed into n sub-tasks according to the task assignment
w = (w1, . . . , wn)
>, where each wi is the sub-task workload assigned to individual i. The task assign-
ment satisfies w  0n and w>1n = 1. The sub-tasks are executed simultaneously.
The selection of scalar values for skill levels and task assignments can be simply interpreted as the assump-
tion that the type of tasks considered in this paper only requires some one-dimension skill. Alternatively,
the skill levels can be considered more generally as the individuals’ overall abilities of contributing to the
completion of tasks, and the task assignments are the individuals’ relative responsibilities to the team.
b) Individual performance: With fixed skill levels x, each individual i’s performance is assumed to
depend only on the task assignment w, denoted by pi(w). The measure of individual performance is defined
below.
Assumption 2 (Individual performance). Given fixed skill levels, each individual i’s performance, with the
assignment w, is measured by pi(w) = f(xi/wi), where f : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is a concave, continuously
differentiable and monotonically increasing function.
The function f is assumed to be concave in that, it is widely adopted that the relation between the
performance f and individual ability x obeys the power law, i.e., f(x) ∼ xγ , with 0 < γ < 1 [1]. Despite the
specific form f(xi/wi) as in Assumption 2, the measure of individual performance can be quite general by
adopting difference measures of xi and wi.
c) Optimal assignment: It is reasonable to claim that, in a well-functioning team, individuals’ relative
responsibilities, characterized by the task assignment in this paper, should be proportional to their actual
abilities. Define the measure of the mismatch between task assignment and individual’s true skill levels as
H1(w) =
∑n
i=1 |wi/xi − 1|. For fixed x, the optimal assignment w∗ = x minimizes H1(w).
2.2 Centralized manager dynamics
In this subsection we introduce a continuous-time centralized model on the evolution of task assignment,
referred to as the manager dynamics. The diagram illustration is given by Figure 1(a). Suppose that, at
each time t, a team of n individuals is completing a task based on the assignment w(t), which is determined
and adjusted along t by an outside manager. The manager observes the individuals’ real-time performance
p
(
w(t)
)
and adjust the task assignment w(t) according to the dynamics:
w˙i = wi
(
pi(w)−
n∑
k=1
wkpk(w)
)
, (2)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The following theorem states the asymptotic behavior of the manager dynamics.
Theorem 1 (Manager dynamics). Consider the manager dynamics (2) for the task assignment as in As-
sumption 1 with performance as in Assumption 2. Then
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Table 1: Notations frequently used in this paper
 (≺ resp.) entry-wise greater than (less than resp.).
 ( resp.) entry-wise no less than (no greater than resp.).
1n (0n resp. ) n-dimension column vector with all entries equal to 1 (0 resp.)
x vector of individual skill levels, with x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
>  0n and x>1n = 1.
w task assignment. w  0n and w>1n = 1
f a concave, continuously differentiable and increasing function f : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞)
p(w) vector of individual performances. p(w) =
(
p1(w), . . . , pn(w)
)>
, where pi(w) =
f(wi/xi) is the performance of individual i.
A appraisal matrix. A = (aij)n×n, where aij is individual i’s appraisal of j’s skill level.
W influence matrix. W = (wij)n×n, where wij is the weight individual i assigns to j’s
opinion.
∆n n-dimension simplex {y ∈ Rn≥0 |y>1n = 1}
int(∆n) the interior of ∆n.
vleft(A) the left dominant eigenvector of the non-negative and irreducible matrix A, i.e., the
normalized entry-wise positive left eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue equal
to A’s spectral radius.
G(B) the directed and weighted graph associated with the adjacency matrix B ∈ Rn×n.
task execution 
based on skill levels
replicator dynamics individual
performance
assignment
(a) manager
assignment rule
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Figure 1: Diagram illustrations of manager dynamics, assign/appraise dynamics, and as-
sign/appraise/influence dynamics.
(i. the set int(∆n) is invariant;
(ii. the optimal assignment w∗ = x is the ESS for the evolutionary game defined by the payoff function
pi(v,w) =
∑n
i=1 vif(xi/wi), and is thus a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for equation (2) as
a replicator dynamics;
(iii. for any w(0) ∈ int(∆n), the manager’s assignment w(t) converges to w∗ = x, as t→∞.
The proof is given in Appendix .1. Equation (2) takes the same form as the classic replicator dynamics [28],
with the nonlinear fitness function pii(w) = f(xi/wi). The same Lyapunov function is used in the proof for
the asymptotic stability. Distinct from the classic result that the ESS, with nonlinear payoff function, can
only lead to local asymptotic stability for the replicator dynamics, our model is a special case in which the
ESS associated with a nonlinear payoff function is also a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium of the
replicator dynamics.
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3 The Assign/Appraise Dynamics of the Appraisal Networks
Despite the desired property on the convergence of the task assignment to optimality, the manager dynamics
does not capture one of the most essential aspects of team dynamics: the evolution of the team’s inner
structures. In this section, we introduce a multi-agent system, in which task assignments are determined by
the team members’ interpersonal appraisals, rather than any outside authority, and the appraisal network
is updated in a decentralized manner, driven by the heterogeneous feedback signals observed by each team
member.
3.1 Model description and problem statement
Appraisal network: Denote by aij the individual i’s evaluation of j’s skill levels and refer to A = (aij)n×n
as the appraisal matrix. Since the evaluations are in the relative sense, we assume A  0n×n and A1n = 1n.
The directed and weighted graph G(A), referred to as the appraisal network, reflects the team’s collective
knowledge on the distribution of its members’ abilities.
Assign/appraise dynamics: We propose a multi-agent model on the evolution of the appraisal network.
The model is referred to as the assign/appraise dynamics and illustrated by the diagram in Figure 1(b).
We model three phases: the task assignment, the feedback signal and the update of the appraisal network,
specified by the following three assumptions respectively.
Assumption 3 (Assignment rule). At any time t ≥ 0, the task is assigned according to the left dominant
eigenvector of the appraisal matrix, i.e., w(t) = vleft
(
A(t)
)
.
Justification of Assumption 3 is given in Appendix .2. For now we assume A(t) is row-stochastic and
irreducible for all t ≥ 0, so that vleft
(
A(t)
)
is always well-defined. This will be proved later in this section.
Assumption 4 (Feedback signal). After executing the task assignment w, each individual i observes, with
no noise, the difference between her own performance and the quality of some part of the whole task, given by∑
kmikpk(w), in which mik denotes the fraction of workload individual k contributes to this part of task. The
matrix M = (mij)n×n defines a directed and weighted graph G(M), referred to as the observation network,
and satisfies M  0n×n and M1n = 1n by construction.
The topology of the observation network defines the individuals’ feedback signal structure and influences
the asymptotic behavior of assign/appraise dynamics. Notice that, the feedback signal for each individual i
is the difference pi
(
w(t)
)−∑kmikpk(w(t)), while the matrix M is not necessarily known to the individuals.
Assumption 5 (Update of interpersonal appraisals). With the performance feedback signal defined as in
Assumption 4, each individual i increases her self appraisal and decreases the appraisals of all the other
individuals, if pi(w) >
∑
kmikpk(w), and vice versa. In addition, the appraisal matrix A(t) remains row-
stochastic.
The following dynamical system for the appraisal matrix, referred to as the appraise dynamics, is arguably
the simplest model satisfying Assumptions 4 and 5:
a˙ii = aii(1− aii)
(
pi(w)−
n∑
k=1
mikpk(w)
)
,
a˙ij = −aiiaij
(
pi(w)−
n∑
k=1
mikpk(w)
)
.
(3)
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The matrix form of the appraise dynamics, together with the assignment rule as in Assumption 3, is given
by  A˙ = diag
(
p(w)−Mp(w))Ad(In −A),
w = vleft(A),
(4)
and collectively referred to as the assign/appraise dynamics. Here Ad = diag(a11, . . . , ann).
Problem statement: In Section III.B, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of dynamics (4), including:
(i. convergence to the optimal assignment, which means that the team as an entirety eventually learns all
its members’ relative skill levels, i.e., limt→+∞w(t) = x;
(ii. appraisal consensus, which means that the individuals asymptotically reach consensus on the appraisals
of all the team members, i.e., aij(t)− akj(t)→ 0 as t→ +∞, for any i, j, k.
Collective learning is the combination of the convergence to optimal assignment and appraisal consensus.
3.2 Dynamical behavior of the assign/appraise dynamics
We start by establishing that the appraisal matrix A(t), as the solution to equation (4), is extensible to all
t ∈ [0,+∞) and the assignment w(t) is well-defined, in that A(t) remains row-stochastic and irreducible.
Moreover, some finite-time properties are investigated.
Theorem 2 (Finite-time properties of assign/appraise dynamics). Consider the assign/appraise dynam-
ics (4), based on Assumptions 3-5, describing a task assignment as in Assumption 1, with performance
as in Assumption 2. For any observation network G(M), and any initial appraisal matrix A(0) that is
row-stochastic, irreducible and has strictly positive diagonal,
(i. The appraisal matrix A(t), as the solution to (4), is extensible to all t ∈ [0,+∞). Moreover, A(t)
remains row-stochastic, irreducible and has strictly positive diagonal for all t ≥ 0;
(ii. there exists a row-stochastic irreducible matrix C ∈ Rn×n with zero diagonal such that
A(t) = diag
(
a(t)
)
+
(
In − diag
(
a(t)
))
C, (5)
for all t ≥ 0, where a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , an(t))> and ai(t) = aii(t), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
(iii. Define the reduced assign/appraise dynamics as
a˙i = ai(1− ai)
(
pi(w)−
n∑
k=1
mikpk(w)
)
,
wi =
ci
(1− ai)
/ n∑
k=1
ck
(1− ak) ,
(6)
where c = (c1, . . . , cn)
> = vleft(C). This dynamics is equivalent to system (4) in the following sense:
The matrix A(t)’s each diagonal entry aii(t) satisfies the dynamics (6) for ai(t), and, for any t ≥ 0,
aii(t) = ai(t) for any i, and aij(t) = aij(0)
(
1− ai(t)
)
/
(
1− ai(0)
)
for any i 6= j;
(iv. The set Ω =
{
a ∈ [0, 1]n∣∣0 ≤ ai ≤ 1− ζi(a(0))}, where ζi(a(0)) = cixi mink xkck (1−ak(0)), is a compact
positively invariant set for the reduced assign/appraise dynamics (6);
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Figure 2: Visualization of the evolution of A(t) and w(t) obeying the assign/appraise dynamics with n = 6.
The observation network is strongly connected. In these visualized matrices and vectors, the darker the
entry, the higher value it has.
(v. the assignment w(t) satisfies the generalized replicator dynamics with time-varying fitness function
ai(t)
(
pi
(
w(t)
)−∑lmilpl(w(t))) for each i:
w˙i = wi
(
ai
(
pi(w)−
n∑
l=1
milpl(w)
)− n∑
k=1
wkak
(
pk(w)−
n∑
l=1
mklpl(w)
))
. (7)
The proof for Theorem 2 is presented in Appendix .3. With the extensibility of A(t) and the finite-time
properties, we now present the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3 (Asymptotic behavior of assign/appraise dynamics). Consider the assign/appraise dynam-
ics (4), based on Assumptions 3-5, with the task assignment as in Assumption 1 and the performance as
in Assumption 2. Assume the observation network G(M) is strongly connected. For any initial appraisal
matrix A(0) that is row-stochastic, irreducible and has positive diagonal,
(i. the solution A(t) converges, i.e., there exists A∗ ∈ Rn×n such that limt→∞A(t) = A∗;
(ii. the limit appraisal matrix A∗ is row-stochastic and irreducible. Moreover, the task assignment satisfies
limt→∞w(t) = vleft(A∗) = x.
The proof is presented in Appendix .4. Theorem 3 indicates that, the teams obeying the assign/appraise
dynamics asymptotically achieves the optimal task assignment, but do not necessarily reach appraisal con-
sensus. Figure 2 gives a visualized illustration of the asymptotic behavior of the assign/appraise dynamics.
Remark 4. From the proof for Theorem 3 we know that, the teams obeying the following dynamicsa˙ii = γi(t)aii(1− aii)
(
pi(w)−
∑
kmikpk(w)
)
,
a˙ij = −γi(t)aiiaij
(
pi(w)−
∑
kmikpk(w)
)
,
also asymptotically achieve the optimal assignment, if each γi(t) remains strictly bounded from 0. This result
indicates that our model can be generalized to the case of heterogeneous sensitivities to performance feedback.
4 The Assign/appraise/influence Dynamics of the Appraisal Net-
works
In this section we further elaborate the assign/appraise dynamics by assuming that the appraisal network is
updated via not only the performance feedback, but also its co-evolution with the team members’ interper-
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sonal influences. In other words, we include an opinion dynamics process among the individuals who discuss
and possibly reach consensus on the values of interpersonal appraisals.
4.1 Model description
The new model, named the assign/appraise/influence dynamics, is defined by three components: the as-
signment rule as in Assumption 3, the appraise dynamics based on Assumptions 4 and 5, and the influence
dynamics, which is the opinion exchanges among individuals on interpersonal appraisals. Denote by wij the
weight individual i assigns to j (including self weight wii) in the opinion exchange. The matrix W = (wij)n×n
defines a directed and weighted graph, referred to as the influence network, is row-stochastic and possibly
time-varying.
The diagram illustration of assign/appraise/influence dynamics is presented in Figure 1(c), and the
general form is given as follows: A˙ = 1τaveFave(A,W ) + 1τappFapp(A,w),w = vleft(A). (8)
The time index t is omitted for simplicity. The term Fapp(A,w) corresponds to the appraise dynamics given
by the right-hand side of the first equation in (4), while the term Fave(A,W ) corresponds to the influence
dynamics specified by the assumption below. Parameters τave and τapp are positive, and relate to the time
scales of influence dynamics and appraise dynamics respectively.
Assumption 6 (Influence dynamics). For the assign/appraise/influence dynamics, assume that, at each
time t ≥ 0, the influence network is identical to the appraisal network, i.e., W (t) = A(t). Moreover, assume
that the individuals obey the classic DeGroot opinion dynamics [4] for the interpersonal appraisals, i.e.,
Fave(W,A) = −(In −W )A.
Based on equation (8) and Assumptions 3-6, the assign/appraise/influence dynamics is written asA˙ = 1τave (A2 −A) + 1τapp diag
(
p(w)−Mp(w))Ad(In −A),
w = vleft(A),
(9)
In the next subsection, we relate the topology of the observation network G(M) to the asymptotic behavior
of the assign/appraise/influence dynamics, i.e., the convergence to optimal assignment and the appraisal
consensus.
4.2 Dynamical behavior of the assign/appraise/influence dynamics
The following lemma shows that, for the assign/appraise/influence dynamics, we only need to consider the
all-to-all initial appraisal network.
Lemma 5 (entry-wise positive for initial appraisal). Consider the assign/appraise/influence dynamics (9)
based on Assumptions 3-6, with the task assignment and performance as in Assumptions 1 and 2 respectively.
For any initial appraisal matrix A(0) that is primitive and row-stochastic, there exists ∆t > 0 such that
A(t)  0n×n for any t ∈ (0,∆t].
The proof is given in Appendix .5. Before discussing the asymptotic behavior, we state a technical
assumption.
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Figure 3: Visualization of the evolution of A(t) and w(t) obeying the assign/appraise/influence dynamics
with n = 6. The observation network contains a globally reachable node. In these visualized matrices and
vectors, the darker the entry, the higher value it has.
Conjecture 6 (Strict lower bound of the interpersonal appraisals). Consider the assign/appraise/influence
dynamics (9) based on Assumptions 3-6, with the task assignment and performance as in Assumptions 1 and 2
respectively. For any A(0) that is entry-wise positive and row-stochastic, there exists amin > 0, depending
on A(0), such that A(t)  amin1n1>n for any time t ≥ 0, as long as A(τ) and w(τ) are well-defined for all
τ ∈ [0, t].
Monte Carlo validation and a sufficient condition for Conjecture 6 are presented in Appendix .6. Now
we state the main results of this section.
Theorem 7 (Assign/appraise/influence dynamical behavior). Consider the assign/appraise/influence dy-
namics (9) based on Assumptions 3-6, with the task assignment and performance as in Assumptions 1 and
Assumption 2 respectively. Suppose that Conjecture 6 holds. Assume that the observation network G(M)
contains a globally reachable node. For any initial appraisal matrix A(0) that is entry-wise positive and
row-stochastic,
(i. the solution A(t) exists and w(t) = vleft
(
A(t)
)
is well-defined for all t ∈ [0,+∞). Moreover, A(t) 
0n×n and A(t)1n = 1n for any t ≥ 0;
(ii. the assignment w(t) obeys the generalized replicator dynamics (7), and ξ01n  w(t) 
(
1−(n−1)ξ0
)
1n,
where
ξ0 =
(
1 + (n− 1)maxk xk
minl xl
γ0
)−1
, and γ0 =
maxk xk/wk(0)
minl xl/wl(0)
;
(iii. as t→ +∞, A(t) converges to 1nx> and thereby w(t) converges to x.
The proof is given in Appendix .7. As Theorem 7 indicates, the team obeying the assign/appraise/
influence dynamics achieves collective learning. A visualized illustration of the dynamics is given by Figure 3.
5 Model Variations: Causes of Failure to Learn
The baseline assign/appraise/influence dynamics (9) consists of three phases: the assignment rule, the
appraise dynamics, and the influence dynamics. In this section, we propose one variation in each of the
three phases, based on some socio-psychological mechanisms that may cause a failure in team learning. We
investigate the behavior of each model variation by numerical simulation.
a) Variation in the assignment rule: task assignment based on degree centrality: In Assumption 3, the
task assignment is based on the individuals’ eigenvector centrality in the appraisal network. If we assume
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x
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Figure 4: Examples of the assign/appraise (first row) and the assign/appraise/influence (second row) dynam-
ics in which the assignment is based on the individuals’ in-degree centrality. The assign/appraise dynamics
does not achieve the collective learning, while the assign/appraise/influence dynamics does.
instead that the assignment is based on the individuals’ normalized in-degree centrality in the appraisal
network, i.e., w(t) = A>(t)1n/1>nA(t)1n, then the numerical simulation, see Figure 4, shows the following
results: the team obeying the assign/appraise dynamics does not necessarily achieve collective learning, while
the team obeying the assign/appraise/influence dynamics still achieves both collective learning and appraisal
consensus.
b) Variation in the appraise dynamics: partial observation of performance feedback: According to As-
sumption 4, the observation network G(M) determines the feedback signals received by each individual. If
the observation network does not have the desired connectivity property, the individuals do not have suffi-
cient information to achieve collective learning. Simulation results in Figure 5 shows that, if G(M) is not
strongly connected for the assign/appraise dynamics, or if G(M) does not contain a globally reachable node
for the assign/appraise/influence dynamics, the team does not necessarily achieve collective learning.
c) Variation in the influence dynamics: prejudice model: In Assumption 6, we assume that the individuals
obey the DeGroot opinion dynamics. If we instead adopt the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics, given by
Fave(A,W ) = −Λ(In −W )A+ (In − Λ)(A(0)−A),
where Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λn) and each λi characterizes individual i’s attachment to her initial appraisals.
Numerical simulation, see Figure 6, shows that the team does not necessarily achieve collective learning.
The Friedkin-Johnsen model captures the social-psychological mechanism in which individuals show an
attachment to their initial opinions. This attachment is a cause of failure of collective learning.
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Figure 5: Examples of failure to learn with partial observation for a six-individual team. The figures in
the first row correspond to the assign/appraise dynamics, in which the observation network is not strongly
connected but contains a globally reachable node. The figures in the second row correspond to the as-
sign/appraise/influence dynamics, in which the observation network does not contain a globally reachable
node. In both cases, A(t) converges but lim
t→+∞w(t) 6= x.
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Figure 6: Example of the evolution of A(t) and w(t) in the prejudice model with n = 6. The darker the
entry, the higher value it has. The simulation result shows that A(t) converges but w(t) = vleft
(
A(t)
)
does
not necessarily converges to x.
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(b) Number of non-transitive triads
Figure 7: Evolution of the measure of mismatch between assignment and individual skill levels, and the num-
ber of non-transitive triads in the comparative appraisal graph. The solid curves represent the team obeying
the assign/appraise/influence dynamics. The dash curves represent the team obeying the assign/appraise
dynamics. The dotted curves represent the team that randomly assign sub-task workloads.
6 Further Discussion and Conclusion
6.1 Connections with TMS theory
TMS structure: As discussed in the introduction, one important aspect of TMS is the members’ shared
understanding about who possess what expertise. For the case of one-dimension skill, TMS structure is
approximately characterized by the appraisal matrix and thus the development of TMS corresponds to the
collective learning on individuals’ true skill levels. Simulation results in Figure 7 compare the evolution of
some features among the teams obeying the assign/appraise/influence model, the assign/appraise model,
and the team that randomly assigns the sub-tasks, respectively. Figure 7(a) shows that, for both the
assign/appraise/influence dynamics and the assign/appraise dynamics, function H1(w,x), as the measure of
the mismatch between task assignment and individual skill levels, converge to 0, which exhibits the advantage
of a developing TMS.
Transitive triads: As Palazzolo [27] points out, transitive triads are indicative of a well-organized TMS.
The underlying logic is that inconsistency of interpersonal appraisals lowers the efficiency of locating the
expertise and allocating the incoming information. In order to reveal the evolution of triad transitivity in
our models, we define an unweighted and directed graph, referred to as the comparative appraisal graph
G˜(A) = (V,E), with V = {1, . . . , n}, as follows: for any i, j ∈ V , (i, j) ∈ E if aij ≥ aii, i.e., if individual i
thinks j has no lower skill level than i herself. We adopt the standard notion of triad transitivity and use
the number of non-transitive triads as the indicator of inconsistency in a team. Figure 7(b) shows that, the
non-transitive triads vanish in the team obeying the assign/appraise/influence dynamics, but persist in the
teams obeying the assign/appraise dynamics or just randomly assigning subtasks.
6.2 Minimum condition for convergence to optimal assignment
Analysis of the asymptotic behavior of assign/appraise dynamics, assign/appraise/influence dynamics and
partial observation model can be interpreted as the exploration of the most relaxed condition for the con-
vergence to optimal task assignment, concluded as follows:
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(i. Each individual only needs to know, as feedback, the difference between her own performance and the
quality of some parts of the entire task, but do not need to know whom they are compared with;
(ii. The individuals can have heterogeneous but strictly positive sensitivities to the performance feedback;
(iii. The exchange of opinions on the interpersonal appraisals is not necessary;
(iv. With opinion exchange, the observation network with one globally reachable node is sufficient for the
convergence to optimal assignment;
(v. Without opinion exchange, strongly connected observation network is sufficient for the convergence to
optimal assignment.
6.3 Conclusion
This paper proposes a baseline model: the centralized manager dynamics, and two elaborative multi-agent
models on team dynamics: the assign/appraise and the assign/appraise/influence dynamics. We reveal in-
sightful connections between our models and the replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory. For the
multi-agents models, the appraisal network is modeled as a team’s basic inner structure. the appraisal net-
work generates the team’s task assignments, and the mismatch between the assignment and individuals’ true
skill levels might indicate the level of team performance. By theoretical analysis we investigate the evolution
of appraisal network, and relate its asymptotic behavior, i.e., the convergence to optimal assignment and
the appraisal consensus, with the individuals’ feedback signal structures. We then propose some variations
of the baseline models, in which some sociological and psychological mechanisms, e.g., the assignment by
in-degree centrality in the appraisal network, the prejudice in opinion dynamics, and the lack of the desired
connectivity property for the observation network, cause the failure of collective learning. In addition, we
show that the qualitative predictions made by our models are consistent with TMS theory in organization
science.
.1 Proof for Theorem 1
The vector form of equation (2) is written as
w˙ = diag(w)
(
p(w)−w>p(w)1n
)
. (10)
Left multiply both sides by 1>n . We get d(1
>
nw)/dt = 0.
Since the function f is continuously differentiable, the right-hand side of equation (10) is continuously
differentiable and locally Lipschitz in int(∆n). Define
V (w) = −
n∑
i=1
xi log
wi
xi
.
We have V (w) ≥ 0 for any w ∈ ∆n, due to the concavity of log function, and V (w) = 0 if and only if
w = x. Moreover, since V (w) is continuously differentiable in w, the level set {w ∈ int(∆n) |V (w) = ξ} is
a compact subset of int(∆n). Along the trajectory,
dV (w)
dt
= −
∑
i∈θ1(w)
(xi − wi)f(xi/wi)−
∑
i∈θ2(w)
(xi − wi)f(xi/wi) < 0,
where θ1(w) = {i |xi ≥ wi} and θ2(w) = {i |xi < wi}. This concludes the proof for the invariant set and
the asymptotic stability of w∗ = x, and one can infer, from the inequality above, that w∗ = x is the ESS
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for the evolutionary game with the payoff function pii(w) = f(xi/wi). Moreover, since V (w) → +∞ as w
tends to the boundary of ∆n, the region of attraction is int(∆n).
.2 Justifications of Assumption 3 on task assignment
We provide some justification of Assumption .2 that, the task assignment w is given by w = vleft(A). Firstly,
the entries of vleft(A) correspond to the individuals’ eigenvector centrality in the appraisal network and thus
reflect how much each individual is appraised by the team. Secondly, there is a natural way in which the
interpersonal interactions lead to the assignment w(t) = vleft
(
A(t)
)
. Assume that for any incoming task, at
step k = 0, each individual i evenly get 1/n workload, and at each step, each individual i passes aij(t) of the
workload she currently possesses to each individual j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, until the substask distribution reaches the
steady state. Denote by qi(k) the fraction of the workload at individual i, at step k, this workload distribution
process is given by q(k + 1) = A(t)>q(k). According to Perron-Frobenius theorem, q(k) converges to
vleft
(
A(t)
)
; Thirdly, our eigenvector assignment rule has the following natural property: in a team deprived
of performance feedback as the information inflow, the team’s task assignment does not change. In other
words, along the assign/appraise/influence dynamics with 1τapp = 0, vector vleft
(
A(t)
)
remains unchanged.
These arguments justify Assumption 3; recall also Section 5(a) with a numerical evaluation of a different
assignment rule.
.3 Proof for Theorem 2
Before the proof, we state a useful lemma summarized from the argument on Page 62-67 of [32].
Lemma 8 (Continuity of eigenvalue and eigenvector). Suppose A,B ∈ Rn×n satisfy |aij | < 1 and |bij | < 1
for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For sufficiently small  > 0,
(i. the eigenvalues λ and λ
′
of A and (A+ B), respectively, can be put in one-to-one correspondence so
that |λ′ − λ| < 2(n+ 1)2(n2) 1n ;
(ii. if λ is a simple eigenvalue of A, then the corresponding eigenvalue λ() of A+ B satisfies |λ()−λ| =
O();
(iii. if v is an eigenvector of A associated with a simple eigenvalue λ, then the eigenvector v() of A+ B
associated with the corresponding eigenvalue λ() satisfies |vi()− vi| = O() for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof of Theorem 2: In this proof, we extend the definition of vleft(A) to the normalized entry-wise
positive left eigenvector, associated with the eigenvalue of A with the largest magnitude, if such an eigenvector
exists and is unique. According to Perron-Frobenius theorem and Lemma 8, vector vleft(A), as long as well-
defined, depends continuously on the entries of A. Therefore, for system (4), there exists a sufficiently
small τ > 0 such that A(t) and w(t) are well-defined and continuously differentiable at any t ∈ [0, τ ], and,
moreover, pi
(
w(t)
) −∑kmikpk(w(t)) remains finite. Therefore, for any t ∈ [0, τ ] and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
aij(t) > 0 if aij(0) > 0; aij(t) = 0 if aij(0) = 0, and thus A(t) is row-stochastic and primitive for any
t ∈ [0, τ ].
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists k 6= i such that aik(0) > 0. According to equation (3),
daij(t)
daik(t)
=
aij(t)
aik(t)
, ∀t ∈ [0, τ ], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i, k},
which leads to aij(t)/aik(t) = aij(0)/aik(0). Let C be an n × n matrix with the entries cij defined as:
(i) cii = 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; (ii) cij = aij(0)
/(
1 − aii(0)
)
for any j 6= i. One can check that C is
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row-stochastic and A(t) is given by equation (5), for any t ∈ [0, τ ], where a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , an(t))> with
ai(t) = aii(t). Since the digraph, with C as the adjacency matrix, has the same topology with the digraph
associated with A(0), matrix C is irreducible and c = vleft(C) is well-defined.
Since the matrix A(t) has the structure given by (5), according to Lemma 2.2 in [11], for any t ∈ [0, τ ],
wi(t) =
ci
1− ai(t)
/∑
k
ck
1− ak(t) .
Therefore, for any t ∈ [0, τ ],
pi
(
w(t)
)
= f
(
xi
ci
(
1− ai(t)
)∑
k
wk(t)
ck
1− ak(t)
)
.
According to equation (3), a˙j(t) ≤ 0 for any j ∈ argmink xkck
(
1− ak(t)
)
. Therefore, argmink
xk
ck
(
1− ak(t)
)
is
increasing, and similarly, argmaxk
xk
ck
(
1− ak(t)
)
is decreasing with t, which implies that, the set
ΩA
(
A(0)
)
=
{
A ∈ Rn×n
∣∣∣A = diag(a) + (I − diag(a))C, 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1− ci
xi
min
k
xk
ck
(
1− akk(0)
)
,∀i
}
is a compact positive invariant set for system (4), as long as A(0) is row-stochastic, irreducible and has
strictly positive diagonal. Moreover, one can check that, for any A ∈ ΩA
(
A(0)
)
, w = vleft(A) is well-defined
and strictly lower (upper resp.) bounded from 0 (1 resp.). Therefore, the solution A(t) is extensible to all
t ∈ [0,+∞) and equations (5) and (6) hold for any t ∈ [0,+∞). Moreover, since pi
(
w(t)
)−∑kmikpk(w(t))
remains bounded, we have aij > 0 if aij(0) > 0 and aij(t) = 0 if aij(0) = 0. This concludes the proof for (i)
- (iv).
For statement (v), differentiate both sides of the equation w>(t)A(t) = w>(t) and substitute equation (4)
into the differentiated equation. We obtain
(w>diag(p(w)−Mp(w))Ad − dw
>
dt
)(In −A) = 0>n ,
where time index t is omitted for simplicity. Equation (7) in (v) is obtained due to w>(t)1n = 1.
.4 Proof for Theorem 3
We prove the theorem by analyzing the generalized replicator dynamics (7) for w(t), and the reduced
assign/appraise dynamics (6) for a(t), given any constant, normalized and entry-wise positive vector c.
According to equation (6), the assignment w = vleft(A) can be considered as a function of the self appraisal
vector a, that is, w(t) = w
(
a(t)
)
for any t ≥ 0. In this proof, let φ(a) = p(w(a))−Mp(w(a)) and denote
by D : Rn × Rn → R≥0 the distance induced by the 2-norm in Rn. For any x ∈ Rn and subset S of Rn,
defined D(x, S) = infy∈S D(x,y).
First of all, for any given a(0) ∈ (0, 1)n, we know that the set Ω, as defined in Theorem 2(iv), is a compact
positively invariant set for dynamics (6), and w(t) is well-defined and entry-wise strictly lower (upper resp.)
bounded from 0n (1n resp.), for all t ∈ [0,+∞).
Secondly, for any a ∈ Ω, define a scalar function
V (a) = log
maxk xk/wk(a)
mink xk/wk(a)
,
and the following index sets
θ(a) =
{
i
∣∣∣ ∃ti > 0 s.t. xi
wi
(
a(t)
) = max
k
xk
wk
(
a(t)
) for any t ∈ [0, ti], with a(0) = a}, and,
θ(a) =
{
j
∣∣∣∃tj > 0 s.t. xj
wj
(
a(t)
) = min
k
xk
wk
(
a(t)
) for any t ∈ [0, tj ], with a(0) = a}.
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Then the right time derivative of V
(
a(t)
)
, along the solution a(t), is given by
d+V
(
a(t)
)
dt
= aj(t)φj
(
a(t)
)− ai(t)φi(a(t)),
for any i ∈ θ(a(t)) and j ∈ θ(a(t)). Define
E =
{
a ∈ Ω ∣∣ ajφj(a)− aiφi(a) = 0for any i ∈ θ(a), j ∈ θ(a)},
E1 =
{
a ∈ E ∣∣φ(a) = 0n},
E2 =
{
a ∈ E ∣∣φ(a) 6= 0n}.
One can check that E and E1 are compact subsets of Ω, E = E1 ∪ E2, and E1 ∩ E2 is empty. Denote by Eˆ
the largest invariant subset of E. Applying the LaSalle Invariance Principle, see Theorem 3 in [12], we have
D(a(t), Eˆ)→ 0 as t→ +∞. Note that, lim
t→+∞D
(
a(t), Eˆ
)
= 0 does not necessarily leads to lim
t→+∞w(t) = x.
We need to further refine the result.
For set E1, it is straightforward to see that E1 ∈ Eˆ and w(a) = x for any a ∈ E1. Now we prove
by contradiction that, if E2 ∩ Eˆ is not empty, then, for any a ∈ E2 ∩ Eˆ, there exists i ∈ θ(a) such that
ai = 0. Suppose ai > 0 for any i ∈ θ(a). Since the observation network G(M) is strongly connected, there
exists a directed path i, k1, . . . , kq, j on G(M), where i ∈ θ(a) and j ∈ θ(a). We have k1 ∈ θ(a), otherwise,
starting with a˜(0) = a, there exists sufficiently small ∆t > 0 such that φi
(
a˜(t)
)
> 0 and a˜i(t) > 0, which
contradicts the fact that a is in the largest invariant set of E. Repeating this argument, we have j ∈ θ(a),
which contradicts φ(a) 6= 0n. Similarly, we have that, for any a ∈ E2 ∩ Eˆ, there exists j ∈ θ(a) with aj = 0.
If the fixed vectors c and x satisfy c = x, then there can not exist a ∈ E2 ∩ Eˆ satisfying all the following
three properties: i) there exists i ∈ θ(a) such that ai = 0; ii) there exists j ∈ θ(a) such that aj = 0; iii)
φ(a) 6= 0n. In this case, E2 ∩ Eˆ is an empty set, which implies that a(t)→ Eˆ = E1 and thus w(t)→ x as
t→ +∞.
Before discussing the case when c 6= x, we present some properties of the individual performance measure:
P1: For any k, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xkck (1−ak) ≤ xlcl (1−al) leads to pk(a) ≤ pl(a), and xkck (1−ak) > xlcl (1−al)
leads to pk(a) > pl(a);
P2: If there exists τ ≥ 0 such that i ∈ θ(a(τ)) and ai(τ) = 0, then i ∈ θ(a(t)) for all t ≥ τ ;
P3: p(a(t)) is finite and strictly bounded from 0, satisfying
f
(xi
ci
(1− ζi(a(0)))
) ≤ pi(a(t)) ≤ f(xi
ci
∑
k
ck
ζk(a(0))
)
,
with ζi(a) defined in Theorem 2(iv).
For the case when c 6= x, consider the partition ϕ1, . . . , ϕm of the index set {1, . . . , n}, with m ≤ n,
satisfying the following two properties:
(i. xk/ck = xl/cl for any k, l in the same subset ϕr;
(ii. xk/ck > xl/cl for any k ∈ ϕr, l ∈ ϕs, with r < s.
For any a ∈ E2 ∩ Eˆ, since there exists j ∈ θ(a) with aj = 0, we have ϕm ⊂ θ(a). For any i ∈ ∪m−1r=1 ϕr, let
E2,i =
{
a ∈ Ω
∣∣∣ ai = 0, aj = 0 for any j ∈ ϕm,
1− xi
ci
ck
xk
≤ ak ≤ 1− min
l∈{1,...,n}
xl
cl
ck
xk
for any k ∈ ϕ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ϕm−1 \ {i}
}
.
With properties P1 and P2 of p(a), for any a ∈ E2,i, we have i ∈ θ(a) and ai = 0. Moreover,
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(i. E2,i ⊂ Rn is compact for any i ∈ ϕ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ϕm−1;
(ii. ∪i∈ϕ1E2,i, . . . ,∪i∈ϕm−1E2,i are disjoint and compact subsets of Rn;
(iii. E2 ∩ Eˆ ⊂
⋃
i∈ϕ1∪···∪ϕm−1 E2,i.
For any a ∈ E2 ∩ Eˆ, since there exists i ∈ θ(a) and j ∈ θ(a) such that ai = aj = 0, on the observation
network G(M), there must exists a path i, k1, . . . , kq satisfying: i) i ∈ θ(a) and ai = 0; ii) akq = 0 and
xkq/ckq < xi/ci; iii) akl > 0 for any l ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}. Consider the trajectory a˜(t) with a˜(0) = a, we have
˙˜akq−1 ≥ a˜kq−1(1− a˜kq−1)
(
f
(xkq−1
ckq−1
(1− a˜kq−1)
n∑
l=1
cl
1− a˜l
)
f
((
mkq−1kq
xkq
ckq
+ (1−mkq−1kq )
xi
ci
) n∑
l=1
cl
1− a˜l
))
.
The inequality is due to properties P1-P3 of pi(a) for i ∈ θ(a) with ai = 0, and the concavity of the function
f . Moreover, since a˜kq−1 is strictly bounded from 1 and
∑
l cl/(1− a˜l) is strictly lower bounded from 0, there
exists Tkq−1(M,a(0),a) > 0 such that
pkq−1
(
a˜(t)
)
<
2−mkq−1kq
2
pi
(
a˜(t)
)
+
mkq−1kq
2
pkq
(
a˜(t)
)
.
Applying the same argument to kq−2, . . . , k1, we have that, there exists Tk1(M,a(0),a) > 0 and
ηik1...kq (M) ∈ (0, 1) such that, for the solution a˜(t) with a˜(0) = a,
pk1
(
a˜(t)
)
<
(
1− ηik1...kq (M)
)
pi
(
a˜(t)
)
+ ηik1...kq (M)pkq
(
a˜(t)
)
,
for all t ≥ Tk1(M,a(0),a). This inequality implies that,
φi
(
a˜(t)
) ≥ mik1ηik1...kq (M)(pi(a˜(t))− pkq(a˜(t)))
≥ mik1ηik1...kq (M)f ′
(
xi
ci
)
·
n∑
l=1
cl
1− ζl
(
a(0)
)(xi
ci
− xkq
ckq
)
> 0.
Since the choices of i and the paths i, k1, . . . , kq are finite, there exists a constant η > 0 such that, for any
a ∈ E2 ∩ Eˆ, there exists T
(
a(0),a
)
> 0 such that, for any t ≥ T (a(0),a) > 0, the solution a˜(t), with
a˜(0) = a, satisfies i ∈ θ(a˜(t)) and φi(a˜(t)) ≥ η > 0.
For any i ∈ ϕ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ϕm−1, define
Eˆ2,i =
{
a ∈ E2,i
∣∣ pi(a)− n∑
k=1
mikpk(a) ≥ η
}
.
We have: i) each Eˆ2,i is a compact subset of Rn; ii) ∪i∈ϕ1Eˆ2,i, . . . ,∪i∈ϕm−1Eˆ2,i are disjoint and compact
subsets of Rn. Let Eˆ2 = ∪m−1r=1
( ∪r∈ϕr Eˆ2,i). For dynamics (6), due to the continuous dependency on the
initial condition, for any a ∈ (E2∩Eˆ)\(Eˆ2∩Eˆ), there exists δ > 0 such that, for any a˜(0) ∈ U(a, δ)∩(E2∩Eˆ),
where U(a, δ) = {b ∈ Ω ∣∣D(b,a) ≤ δ}, a˜(t) ∈ Eˆ2 ∩ Eˆ for sufficiently large t. Therefore, a can not be an
ω-limit point of a(0). We thus obtain that, the ω-limit set of a(0) is in the set E1∪(Eˆ2∩Eˆ). Moreover, since
E1,∪i∈ϕ1Eˆ2,i, . . . ,∪i∈ϕm−1Eˆ2,i are disjoints compact subsets of Rn, and the ω-limit set of a(0) is connected
and compact, a(t) can only converge to one of the sets E1,∪i∈ϕ1Eˆ2,i, . . . ,∪i∈ϕm−1Eˆ2,i.
Now we prove limt→+∞D(a(t), E1) = 0 by contradiction. Suppose ω
(
a(0)
) ∈ ∪i∈ϕr Eˆ2,i for some r ∈
{1, . . . ,m− 1}. Since each Eˆ2,i is a compact set, there exists  > 0 and η() > 0 such that φi(a) ≥ η() > 0
for any a ∈ U(Eˆ2,i, ). For this given  > 0, since ω
(
a(0)
) ∈ ∪i∈ϕr Eˆ2,i leads to D(a(t),∪i∈ϕr Eˆ2,i) → 0 as
t → +∞, we conclude that, there exists T > 0 such that, for any t ≥ T , a(t) ∈ ∪i∈ϕrU(Eˆ2,i, ). Define
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Vr(a) = mini∈ϕr ai, for any a ∈ ∪i∈ϕrU(Eˆ2,i, ). The function Vr(a) satisfies that, Vr(a) ≥ 0 for any
a ∈ ∪i∈ϕrU(Eˆ2,i, ) and Vr(a) = 0 if and only if a ∈ ∪i∈ϕr Eˆ2,i. Therefore, D
(
a(t),∪i∈ϕr Eˆ2,i
)→ 0 leads to
Vr
(
a(t)
)→ 0 as t→ +∞. Moreover, since a ∈ U(Eˆ2,i, ) for any i ∈ argmink∈ϕr ak, we have
d+Vr
(
a(t)
)
dt
= min
i∈argmin
k∈ϕr
ak(t)
a˙i(t) ≥ δai(t)
(
1− ai(t)
)
.
According to Theorem 2(i), for any given a(0) ∈ (0, 1)n, a(t) ∈ (0, 1)n for all t ≥ 0. Therefore,
d+Vr(a(t))/dt > 0 for all t ≥ T , which contradicts limt→+∞ Vr
(
a(t)
)
= 0. Therefore, we have
limt→+∞D(a(t), E1) = 0 and limt→+∞w(t) = x.
Since A˙(t)→ 0n×n as φ
(
a(t)
)→ 0n, there exists an entry-wise non-negative and irreducible matrix A∗,
depending on A(0) and satisfying vleft(A
∗) = x, such that A(t)→ A∗ as t→ +∞. This concludes the proof.
.5 Proof for Lemma 5
Since A(0) is primitive and row-stochastic, following the same argument in the proof for Theorem 2(i), we
have that, there exists ∆t˜ > 0 such that, for any t ∈ [0,∆t˜]: i) w(t) is well-defined and w(t)  0n; ii) A(t)
is bounded, continuously differentiable to t, and satisfies A(t)1n = 1n; iii) p
(
w(t)
)−Mp(w(t)) is bounded.
Therefore, for any t ≥ 0, there exists µ, depending on t and A(0), such that A˙(t)  1τaveA2(t)−( 1τave +µ)A(t).
Consider the equation B˙(t) = 1τaveB
2(t)−( 1τave +µ)B(t), with B(0) = A(0). According to the comparison
theorem, A(t)  B(t) for any t ≥ 0. Let bi(t) be the i-th column of B(t) and let yk(t) = e( 1τave+µ)tbk(t). We
obtain y˙k(t) =
1
τave
B(t)yk(t).
Denote by Φ(t, 0) the state transition function for the equation y˙k(t) =
1
τave
B(t)yk(t), which is written
as Φ(t, 0) = In +
∑∞
k=1 Φk(t), where Φ1(t) =
∫ t
0
B(τ1)dτ1 and Φl(t) =
∫ t
0
B(τ1)
∫ τ1
0
. . . B(τl−1)
∫ τl−1
0
B(τl)dτl
for l ≥ 2. By computing the MacLaurin expansion for each Φk(t) and summing them together, we obtain
that
Φ(t, 0) = In + h1(t)B(0) + h2(t)B
2(0) + · · ·+ hn−1(t)Bn−1(0) +O(tn),
where hk(t) is a polynomial with the form hk(t) = ηk,kt
k + ηk,k+1t
k+1 + . . . , and, moreover, ηk,k > 0 for
any k ∈ N. Therefore, for t sufficiently small, we have hk(t) > 0 for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. Moreover, since
Bk(0)  0n×n for any k ∈ N and B(0)+· · ·+Bn−1(0)  0n×n, there exists ∆t ≤ ∆t˜ such that Φ(t, 0)  0n×n
for any t ∈ [0,∆t].
.6 Discussion on Conjecture 6
The Monte Carlo method [29] is adopted to estimate the probability that Conjecture 6 holds. For any
randomly generated A(0) ∈ int(∆n), define the random variable Z : int(∆n)→ {0, 1} as
(i. Z
(
A(0)
)
= 1 if there exists amin > 0 such that A(t)  amin1n1>n for all t ∈ [0, 1000];
(ii. Z
(
A(0)
)
= 0 otherwise.
Let p = P
[
Z
(
A(0)
)
= 1
]
. For N independent random samples Z1, . . . , ZN , in each of which A(0) is randomly
generated in int(∆n), define pˆN =
∑N
i=1 Zi/N . For any accuracy  ∈ (0, 1) and confidence level 1−ξ ∈ (0, 1),
|pˆN − p| <  with probability greater than 1− ξ if
N ≥ 1
22
log
2
ξ
. (11)
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For  = ξ = 0.01, the Chernoff bound (11) is satisfied by N = 27000. We run 27000 independent MATLAB
simulations of the assign.appraise/influence dynamics with n = 7 and find that pˆN = 1. Therefore, for any
A(0) ∈ int(∆n), with 99% confidence level, there is at least 0.99 probability that A(t) is entry-wise strictly
lower bounded from 0n×n for all t ∈ [0, 10000].
Moreover, we present in the following lemma a sufficient condition for Conjecture 6 on the initial appraisal
matrix A(0) and the parameters τave, τapp.
Lemma 9 (Strictly positive lower bound of appraisals). Consider the assign/appraise/influence dynam-
ics (9), based on Assumptions 3-6, with the assignment w(t) and performance p(w) as in Assumptions 1
and 2 respectively. For any initial appraisal matrix A(0) that is entry-wise positive and row-stochastic, as
long as
τapp
τave
≥ 1− ξ0
ξ0
(
f
(
xmax
ξ0
)
− f
(
xmin
1− (n− 1)ξ0
))
,
where the constant ξ0 is defined as in Theorem 7 (ii), then there exists amin > 0 such that A(t)  amin1n1>n .
Proof. First of all, by definition we have ws(t) =
∑
k wk(t)aks(t). The right-hand side of this equation is a
convex combination of {a1s(t), . . . , ans(t)}. Therefore, maxk aks(t) ≥ ws(t) ≥ ξ0 for all t ∈ [0,+∞).
At any time t ≥ 0, for any pair (i, j) such that aij(t) = mink,l akl(t), the dynamics for aij(t) is
a˙ij(t) =
1
τave
(∑
k
aik(t)akj(t)− aij(t)
)
− 1
τapp
aii(t)aij(t)
(
pi
(
w(t)
)− n∑
k=1
mikpk
(
w(t)
))
.
For simplicity, in this proof, denote φi = pi
(
w(t)
)−∑nk=1mikpk(w(t)). Suppose amj(t) = maxk akj(t). We
have
a˙ij(t) ≥ 1
τave
aij(t)amj(t)− 1
τave
a2ij(t)−
1
τapp
aii(t)aij(t)φi.
Therefore,
a˙ij
aij
≥ 1
τave
ξ0 − 1
τapp
(1− ξ0)
(
f
(xmax
ξ0
)− f( xmin
1− (n− 1)ξ0
))
.
The condition on 1τave /
1
τapp
in Lemma 9 guarantees that a˙ij(t)
/
aij(t) is positive if aij(t) = mink,l akl(t). This
concludes the proof.
.7 Proof for Theorem 7
Statement (i) is proved following the same argument in the proof for Theorem 2 (i). For any given A(0)
that is row-stochastic and entry-wise positive, the closed and bounded invariant set Ω for A(t) is given by
Ω =
{
A ∈ Rn×n ∣∣A  amin1n1>n , A1n = 1n}, where amin > 0 is given by Conjecture 6.
Since w>(t)
(
A2(t) − A(t)) = 0>n for all t ≥ 0, we conclude that, w(t) in the assign/appraise/influence
dynamics also obeys the generalized replicator dynamics (7). Consider w(t) as a function of A(t). Define
φ(A) = p
(
w(A)
)−Mp(w(A)) and
V (A) = log
maxk xk/wk(A)
mink xk/wk(A)
.
For any t ∈ [0,+∞), there exists i ∈ argmaxk xk/wk
(
A(t)
)
and j ∈ argmink xk/wk
(
A(t)
)
such that
V
(
A(t)
)
= log
(
xiwj
(
A(t)
)/
xjwi
(
A(t)
))
, and d
+V (A)
dt = ajjφj(A) − aiiφi(A) ≤ 0. Therefore, V
(
A(t)
)
is non-increasing with t, which in turn implies
xi
xj
wj(t)
wi(t)
≤ maxk xk/wk(0)
mink xk/wk(0)
= γ0,
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for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This inequality, combined with the fact that ∑k wk(t) = 1 for any t ≥ 0, leads to
the inequalities in statement (ii).
Similar to the proof for Theorem 3, define
θ(A) =
{
i
∣∣∣∃ ti > 0 s.t. xi
wi
(
A(t)
) = max
k
xk
wk
(
A(t)
) for any t ∈ [0, ti] with A(0) = A},
θ(A) =
{
j
∣∣∣ ∃ tj > 0 s.t. xj
wj
(
A(t)
) = min
k
xk
wk
(
A(t)
) for any t ∈ [0, tj ] with A(0) = A},
and let E =
{
A ∈ Ω ∣∣ d+V (A)/dt = 0}. For any A ∈ E, since A  amin1n1>n , we have φi(A) = φj(A) = 0
for any i ∈ θ(A) and j ∈ θ(A). Suppose individual s is a globally reachable node in the observation network.
There exists a directed path i, k1, . . . , kq, s. Without loss of generality, suppose q ≥ 1. For any A in the
largest invariant subset of E, we have k1 ∈ θ(A) and therefore φk1(A) = 0. This iteration of argument leads
to s ∈ θ(A). Following the same line of argument, we have s ∈ θ(A). Therefore, for any given A(0)  0n×n
that is row-stochastic, the solution A(t) converges to Eˆ = {A ∈ Ω |φ(A) = 0n} = {A ∈ Ω |vleft(A) = x}.
Let A˜ = maxj
(
maxk akj − mink akj
)
. One can check that d+V˜ (A)/dt along the dynamics (9) is a
continuous function of A for any A ∈ Ω. Define Eˆ/2 =
{
A ∈ Eˆ ∣∣ ‖A− 1nx>‖2 ≥ /2}. Since Eˆ is compact,
Eˆ/2 is also a compact set. For any A ∈ Eˆ/2, since d+V˜ (A)/dt is strictly negative and depends continuously
on A, there exists a neighborhood U(A, rA) = {A˜ ∈ Ω | ‖A˜ − A‖2 ≤ rA} such that d+V˜ (A˜)/dt < 0 for
any A˜ ∈ U(A, rA). Due to the compactness of Eˆ/2 and according to the Heine-Borel finite cover theorem,
there exists K ∈ N and {Ak, rk}k∈{1,...,K}, where Ak ∈ Eˆ/2 and rk > 0 for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, such that
Eˆ/2 ⊂ ∪Kk=1U(Ak, rk).
Define the distance D : Rn ×Rn → R≥0 as in the proof for Theorem 3. Let δ = min{r1, . . . , rk, /2} and
B1 =
{
A ∈ Ω ∣∣D(A, Eˆ) ≤ δ,D(A, Eˆ/2) > δ},
B2 =
{
A ∈ Ω ∣∣D(A, Eˆ) ≤ δ,D(A, Eˆ/2) ≤ δ}.
We have B1 ∩B2 is empty. For any A ∈ B1, since D(A, Eˆ) ≤ δ, D(A, Eˆ/2) > δ, there exists A˜ ∈ Eˆ/2 such
that D(A, A˜) ≤ δ. Since D(A˜,1nx>) < /2, we have D(A,1nx>) ≤ D(A, A˜) + D(A˜,1nx>) < . Therefore,
B1 ⊂ U(1nx>, ). Moreover, since B2 is compact, V˜ (A) is lower bounded and d+V˜ (A)/dt is strictly upper
bounded from 0 in B2. Since limt→+∞D(A(t), Eˆ) = 0, there exists t0 > 0 such that A(t) ∈ B1 ∪B2 for any
t ≥ 0. Therefore, for any t ≥ t0, there exists t1 ≥ t such that A(t1) ∈ B1. This argument is valid for any
 > 0, which implies that 1nx> is an ω-limit point for any given A(0).
Since Eˆ is compact, D(A, E˜) is strictly positive. Since limt→+∞D
(
A(t), Eˆ
)
= 0, any A ∈ Ω \ Eˆ can not
be an ω-limit point of A(0). For any A ∈ Eˆ \ {1nx>}, since the solution passing through A asymptotically
converges to 1nx>, A ∈ Eˆ \ {1nx>} can not be an ω-limit point of A(0) either. Therefore, the ω-limit set
of A(0) is {1nx>}. This concludes the proof.
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